Branch Davidian CS gas deployment during siege

Branch Davidian CS gas deployment during siege

The governmental report on the decision to utilize tear gas during the Waco siege

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or ATF, use of tear gas was one of the more controversial decisions of the siege. The stalemate between the ATF and the Davidians led the attorney general, Janet Reno, to authorize the use of tear gas, more specifically CS gas, as a way of entering into the compound. At this point, the siege had been active for over fifty days and the ATF and the local and federal governments were anxious to end the affair. The final straw that catalyzed Reno to authorize the tear gas was the growing concern for the children within the compound, which Reno claimed were living in increasingly dilapidated conditions. However, the plan failed; the CS gas was deployed for around six hours when suddenly the compound burst into flames resulting in over eighty people dying, including every single one of the children. Many criticized Reno for authorizing the tear gas because there was no substantive evidence, as stated by the FBI report, that there was any significant child abuse. There were two main criticisms for the use of tear gas in the siege raised by the Los Angeles Times article “Use of Tear Gas in Waco Raid Under Scrutiny : Siege: Experts raise safety questions. Reno says she was assured substance would not harm children” by Glenn Bunting: first, that CS gas is extremely flammable and when in flames produces lethal hydrogen cyanide gas; second, even if the compound had not burst into flames, CS gas is still noxious for young children. Given the fact that the government did not provide gas masks for the children, for many, the use of the gas seemed counterintuitive and poorly thought out, and could harm the children more than leaving them alone. As a rebuttal to the previous claims, the federal government stated that they did not deploy an amount of CS gas considered lethal, and that the cause of the fire was started by the number of illegal firearms in David Koresh’s possession. The true cause of the fire and the death of the Branch Davidians is still widely debated today and set a precedent for the use of tear gas in subsequent raids throughout the country.

Committee on Government Reform

The Committee on Government Reform. "The Tragedy at Waco: New Evidence Examined." The Committee on Government Reform, Congress. 28 December 2000. https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt1037/CRPT-106hrpt1037.pdf

Bunting, Glenn. "Use of Tear Gas in Waco Raid Under Scrutiny : Siege: Experts raise safety questions. Reno says she was assured substance would not harm children." Los Angeles Times. 29 May 1995.

The United States Congress

December 28, 2000

Committee on Government Reform

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Report

https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt1037/CRPT-106hrpt1037.pdf

United States of America

2. The Proposed Operations Plan
As it became clear that the standoff with the Davidians could be
a protracted one, a formal, written operations plan was drafted
under the direction of FBI SAC Jeff Jamar and HRT Commander
Richard Rogers.24 As was the case with the emergency plan, the
operations plan was sent up the FBI’s chain of command, except
this time it was presented to Attorney General Janet Reno.
Several earlier versions had been drafted and proposed, and
these earlier versions provided for immediate insertion of tear gas
by the combined use of CEVs with boom-mounted gas cylinders
along with ferret rounds shot into every opening into the compound. These earlier versions were not approved.
The FBI’s proposed operations plan, as submitted and approved
by Attorney General Janet Reno, described what was to occur on
April 19, 1993, in the following manner:
On order, two CEVs will enter the compound inside the
concertina wire prior to sunrise. One CEV will penetrate
the structure on the 1st floor, at the White/Green corner
utilizing the boom and project tear gas via the Mark 5 delivery system secured to the boom. After delivery, the CEV will retreat from the structure and stand-by. The second
CEV will stand by and upon retreat by the 1st CEV, will
insert additional tear gas into the 2nd floor of the White/
Green corner. Prior to the entry of the CEVs, the BVs
[Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a type of armored personnel
carrier] will be engaged in routine spotlight maintenance.
Upon delivery of the tear gas by the CEV, a BV on the
Green side will deliver Ferret liquid tear gas rounds into
the top of the black covering on the unfinished and unoccupied construction in order to deny access in this area. If
firing commences from the Compound, the BVs will be prepared to deliver Ferret liquid tear gas rounds into all windows/openings in the compound structure. If all subjects
fail to exit the compound structure after 48 hours of tear
gas, then, on order, a modified CEV will proceed to open
up/disassemble the structure at the location where the
structure was least gassed until all subjects are located.25
The operations plan clearly outlines the tactics to be employed.
That is, the two CEVs would ‘‘penetrate the structure . . . utilizing
the boom and project tear gas via the Mark 5 delivery system secured to the boom.’’ The CEVs would insert tear gas incrementally,
and only one CEV would insert gas at a time. Right after the CEVs
first began inserting tear gas, a Bradley would approach the ‘‘unfinished and unoccupied’’ tornado shelter and fire ferret rounds
through the top. If the Davidians fired at the HRT, then the HRT
would shoot ferret rounds into all openings in the compound.
The plan also details the type of tear gas to be used; the CEVs
would discharge tear gas from the cylinders mounted on their
booms and the HRT would be firing liquid ferret rounds. There is
no mention in the operations plan of the possibility of using any
pyrotechnic types of tear gas rounds.

Photo of report